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Abstract 
 
The movement from the Original to the Endogenous Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) theory 
implied that candidates for a monetary union were not required to comply with a number of 
economic conditions before the incorporation, but they would do it once they became members. 
Although there are multiple endogeneity channels, this paper investigates the labor market one. 
According to this strand of literature, the creation of a monetary union could stimulate countries 
to increase flexibility in their labor markets, leading them to converge. Using thirty-three years of 
data for twenty-two industrialized countries, we find a positive and growing relationship between 
labor market reforms and income correlations. However, this positive relationship vanishes in the 
case of peripheral Eurozone countries as compared to Germany. In addition, their unemployment 
rate correlations have become negative, that is EMU has not stimulated labor market reforms in 
these countries: the monetary union has not endogenously generated the mechanism to activate 
a better functioning of the labor market.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since its inception, the Optimum Currency Areas (OCA from now on) theory, developed by 
Mundell in 1961, has been transformed. The Original OCA theory implied that applicant 
countries for a monetary union should comply with a number of economic conditions in order 
to guarantee the perfect operation of the monetary union, that is to say, in order to achieve 
an optimal currency area. However, the accession criteria were confusing and pointed in 
different directions. This is the reason why some authors began to interpret the criteria jointly, 
bringing the birth of the endogenous OCA theory. According to this reformulation, countries 
are not required to comply with the conditions before joining, since they will do it once they 
are members. Therefore, the creation of a monetary union would lay the foundations for the 
monetary union to be optimal.  
 
The European Monetary Union (EMU from now on) has been, since its creation, the testing 
ground for the endogeinity of OCA theory. A number of authors has tested some endogeneity 
channels and the results show that, despite endogeneity is fulfilled in some fields, actually 
the EMU is not an optimum currency area. It consists of a conglomerate of heterogeneous 
countries with different structural conditions and growth dynamics. The current economic 
and financial crisis and its different impact on the EMU countries has implied the resurgence 
of the interest in the OCA theory.  
Especially, the differences have been relevant as far as the unemployment rates are 
concerned. The Core countries, such as Germany, Belgium or Austria, have achieved control 
on their unemployment rates, while in the peripheral countries, such as Spain or Greece, 
unemployment rates have grown inordinately.  
 
For that reason, this paper focuses on the area called by De Grauwe-Mongelli (2005) the 
‘endogeneity of labour markets. We will test if countries  that implement structural reforms 
on their labor markets tend to converge in real terms, and whether or not the EMU has 
simulated Eurozone countries (especially those with major adjustment problems) to increase 
flexibility in their labor markets. To do that, we will use bilateral correlations along a period 
of thirty-three years and data from twenty-two industrialized countries, and we will base on 
graphical evidence. 
 
Section 2 presents a review of the theoretical literature regarding to OCA theory, then section 
3 provides a summary of the empirical literature focusing on the EMU, with tests done by a 
number of authors about the endogeneity of OCA theory in the Eurozone. Hereafter, section 
4 explains the methodology and data used in our test. Lastly, section 4 brings the results 
and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. Review of theoretical literature 
 
2.1 The OCA criteria 
 
It was Robert Mundell, Nobel Prize in 1999, who introduced the well-known Optimum 
Currency Area (OCA) theory more than 40 years ago. An OCA could be defined as a 
geographical region which maximizes its economic efficiency by sharing a common 
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currency. Therefore, for a currency area to be optimal the benefits of monetary unification 
should exceed the costs. On one hand, joining a monetary union eliminates exchange rates 
between member countries thereby eliminating the likelihood of competitive devaluations 
and leading to greater trade linkages and higher investment as well, because transaction 
costs across borders are much lower and the exchange rate uncertainty vanishes. 
Furthermore, countries characterized by a little disciplined monetary policy may benefit from 
relinquishing its monetary autonomy to a supranational institution much more rigorous who 
applies a uniform monetary policy, thereby reducing the inflation bias. However, being part 
of a currency union implies the loss of monetary independence such that exchange rate 
cannot be used as an instrument of short run adjustment. According to Luca Antonio Ricci 
(2008) for the exchange rate between two countries to be such an effective adjustment tool, 
three conditions must be fulfilled: (1) the two regions face asymmetric disturbances which 
require an adjustment of good prices, (2) wage and price flexibility are low, such that prices 
do not adjust immediately to the shocks, (3) and a relative price change caused by an 
exchange rate change is not quickly neutralized by national price movements. Nevertheless, 
as it will be explained later, countries which join a monetary union are expected to converge 
economically, such that they will face symmetric shocks. Moreover, one of the endogenous 
OCA properties is that monetary unification increases wage and price flexibility of member 
countries. Under this conditions, it seems that if a monetary union becomes optimal, the loss 
of the exchange rate instrument as an adjustment tool becomes less important. Following 
the case of a demand shift developed by Mundell (1961) and De Grauwe (2004), imagine 
two member countries A and B of a monetary union. For some reasons, the demand for 
products of country B increases at the expenses of the demand of country A. 
 
 
      Figure 1: Aggregate demand shifts in country A and B. 
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This is reflected by an upward movement of the country B demand and a downward 
movement in that one of the country A, such that output and prices in country A decrease 
and country B experiences a higher output and an increasing price pressure. At this moment, 
there is an adjustment problem between countries. However, De Grauwe argues that if 
wages and prices are flexible or there is labour mobility, a mechanism of automatic 
equilibration will take place. 
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                      Figure 2: The automatic equilibration mechanism. 
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On one hand, if wages and prices are flexible, workers of country A who are unemployed 
will claim lower wages and the wage rate in that country will be lower such that the supply 
curve will shift downward and the equilibrium will be reached. For its part, country B will 
experience the opposite, and its supply curve will shift upwards due to the increasing wage 
pressure, achieving the old equilibrium. On the other hand, if labor is mobile across 
countries, workers of country A who are unemployed will move to country B to find a job. 
The excess of labor demand in country B will decrease wages and the lack of labor demand 
in country A will increase wages in that country, thereby balancing the labor market again 
and adjusting both economies after the demand shock. However, for a country with a low 
degree of wage and price flexibility before being a member country who cannot achieve 
higher wage flexibility after the unification, the loss of monetary autonomy could be dramatic.  
 
Mundell (1961) postulated that in an OCA either the member countries face symmetric 
shocks, or if shocks are asymmetric they are able to absorb them. This is the reason why 
Mundell advocates flexible wages and prices and production factors mobility within the 
union. These conditions together with the contributions of Ingram (1962), McKinnon (1963) 
and Kenen (1963) built the ‘original’ OCA properties, which are the characteristics 
considered as crucial for judging whether it’s convenient for a group of countries to form a 
monetary union or not. According to these properties, for a country to be a suitable member 
of a currency union it should meet the criteria ex-ante:  
 
 
(a) Wage and price flexibility. The higher both are, the easier the adjustment process 
after a shock will be. 
(b) Capital and labor mobility. The grater the labor mobility is, the easier to be part of a 
currency union will be, since the cost of losing the exchange rate instrument will be 
lower. 
(c) A high degree of economic openness increases the likelihood of joining a currency 
union. 
(d) Diversification of production or exports increases the attractiveness of sharing a 
common currency, considering that it reduces the likelihood of specific shocks to any 
sector and, accordingly, the stabilization cost of joining a monetary union. 
(e) Similarity of inflation rates, because differences could result in disparities in structural 
developments, diversities in labor markets and differences in economic policies 
(Mongelli, 2005). 
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(f) Similarity of economic structures. The more similar the countries are, the more 
symmetric shocks they will confront, and the more likely to join a monetary will be.  
(g) Financial market integration. It can reduce the need for exchange rate adjustments 
(Ingram, 1969).Furthermore, if financial markets are integrated, even a small change 
in interest rates would imply a quick allocation of capital across countries, leading to 
lower differences in long-term interest rates. 
 
 
However, many authors critizised the ‘original’ OCA theory for various reasons. Dellas and 
Tavlas (2009) supported that these properties point in different directions, such that they are 
contradictory and inconsistent: 
 
 
‘An economy that is small and open, suggesting the preferability of pegged exchange rates, 
might also possess a low degree of labor mobility, implying the desirability of flexible 
exchange rates.  The openness characteristic suggests that small economies should adopt 
pegged rates since small economies are likely to be relatively open. Such economies, 
however, are also apt to be relatively undiversified, making them better candidates for 
flexible rates according to the diversification criterion’. (Dellas and Tavlas, 2009, p.1126) 
 
 
In this way, the suitability for a country to be part of a currency union may depend on the 
criterion considered. This is the reason why some authors started to interpret them jointly 
and this meant the emersion of a number of weaknesses and limitations behind the 
pioneering OCA theory. For example, McKinnon (2004) postulated that countries which form 
a monetary union could reduce the likelihood of asymmetric shock by diversifying their 
income sources. In this way, countries would no need to accomplish with the similarity of 
shocks prerequisite if they were financially integrated.1 Furthermore, as it has been said 
above, similarity of inflation rates was also a condition which must be taken into account in 
order to assess the suitability for a future member country. However, to share a common 
currency and to follow a uniform monetary policy is an opportunity for countries to ‘tie their 
hands’ and to gain low-inflation credibility, thereby leading to a full monetary union with a 
low inflation rate in each country. Therefore, the similarity of countries’ inflation rate before 
forming a monetary union becomes a less important precondition because once a country 
is a member, the common and supranational monetary policy will lead its inflation rate to a 
low level and to converge with the best inflation rate (the lowest one) of the union.2  
   
 
The joint interpretation of the traditional OCA criteria and the European Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) experience together with the advances in econometric techniques 
meant the emergence of the ‘new’ OCA theory that deals with the endogeneity of currency 
areas. Such new OCA theory defends that a country’s suitability to become a member of a 
monetary union cannot be judged on the basis of its historical data, since once a country 
becomes a member, drastic economic changes are expected to occur (an application of the 
Lucas Critique). The starting example shows us that countries who join a monetary union 
and thus relinquish their monetary independence, could deregulate labour mobility across 
country borders and increase wage and price flexibility in order to ease the adjustment 
                                                          
1 For more information about the joint interpretation of OCA properties see Corden (1972), Ishiyama 
(1975), Tower and Willet, Tavlas (1994) and McKinnon (2004). 
2 For more detail see Gondolfo (1992). 
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process due to the impossibility to use monetary policy as an adjustment tool, that is a 
monetary union could encourage countries to undertake structural reforms.  In this way, 
member countries are more likely to meet the OCA criteria ex post than ex ante. Therefore, 
the new vision of the OCA implied a reformulation of the old properties and the establishment 
of 4 differentiate endogeneity areas by De Grauwe-Mongelli (2005): endogeneity of 
economic integration, endogeneity of financial integration, endogeneity of symmetric shocks 
and endogeneity of product and labour market. Endogeneity of economic integration refers 
to the fact that monetary unification increases trade between member countries leading to 
a higher economic convergence3. Endogeneity of financial integration is less empirically 
proved and may imply a convergence of nominal interest rates and a significant risk-sharing. 
Endogeneity of symmetric shocks means that clustering forces could dominate over 
dispersion forces leading to more synchronized outputs, whereas endogeneity of product 
and labor markets implies that after the unification, countries may increase the flexibility in 
these markets. In section 3, some empirical analysis of the endogeneity of OCA will be 
explained in more detail. 
 
 
 
2.2 The endogenous OCA theory and the EMU case 
 
According to Eichengreen (1996), ‘like it or not, the theory of Optimum Currency Areas 
remains the workhorse for analyses of European monetary unification. Indeed, many 
economists do not like it very much’. 
 
The integration process of EU began in 1957 when The Treaty of Rome founded the 
European Economic Community (ECC). After that, a number of countries joined the ECC 
and The European Single Act (1987) consolidated the European Single market, which 
implied free movement of goods, services, labor and capital between member countries. It 
seemed that de following step for the integration process to continue was the monetary 
unification. However, not all the ECC member countries agreed, and those who don’t had to 
sign an exemption clause (Denmark and United Kingdom). The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) 
built a foundation of monetary unification. It implied the formation of an independent 
European Central Bank who would apply a uniform monetary policy, and the existence of a 
single currency. Furthermore, it contained some requisites that those countries who wanted 
to join the monetary union had to accomplish with a year before the exam. These 
preconditions were:  
 
(I) An inflation rate not higher of 1.5 percentage points and an interest rate not 
higher of 2 percentage point than the average rate of the three member countries 
with the lowest ones, in order to reach price stability. 
(II) A public deficit/GDP ratio not higher than 3%  
(III) A public debt/GDP ratio not higher than 60% 
(IV) A stable exchange rate during two the two years before the exam, when currency 
devaluations were not allowed. 
 
                                                          
3 Frankel and Rose (1998) found that countries who became members of the EMU increased their 
bilateral trade beyond the simple effect of the elimination of the exchange rate volatility. In particular, 
they calculated a multiplier value of three or higher, known as ‘The Rose effect’. 
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The Maastricht criteria were actually convergence criteria. The goal of such preconditions 
was to get similar countries in nominal terms in order the reach similar countries in real 
terms. Those countries who pass the exam were the first in forming the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), and the euro started to flow in 2002. Since then, a number of 
countries has joined the EMU once they accomplished with the Maastricht criteria, and 
nowadays the EMU is formed by 18 heterogeneous nations. But, has the EMU experience 
showed real convergence between member countries according to the OCA theory¿, Are 
the Maastricht criteria enough to assess the suitability for a country to be an EMU member¿, 
is there any evidence of the OCA endogeneity in EMU?, Is the EMU an optimal currency 
area? 
 
The following section contains a revision of the empirical literature about the endogeneity of 
OCA in the EMU case. 
 
 
 
 
3. Review of empirical literature: the EMU case 
 
The interest for the EMU case as an international example of monetary unification and the 
advances in econometric analysis encouraged many authors to test the endogeneity of OCA 
theory in the European scenario.  
 
As it has been said before, one of the endogeneity areas of the new OCA theory according 
to De Grauwe-Mongelli (2005) is the endogeneity of economic integration referring to the 
fact that monetary unification strengthens trade linkages between member countries and 
thus it leads countries to converge. Frankel and Rose demonstrated in 1998 that monetary 
unification rises trade between countries three times or more than the increase which would 
take place if we only took into account for the fact that the exchange rate volatility has 
vanished (‘The Rose effect’)4. However, it has been widely discussed whether this fact would 
lead member countries to a higher degree of output convergence or not, that is ‘the 
specialization paradigm’. According to Krugman (1993), if bilateral trade between 
countries rises, they will specialize in those products in which production they have 
comparative advantage such that they will be more vulnerable to sector specific shocks and 
their outputs will be less correlated. In contrast, the Commission’s point of view is that 
monetary unification raises trade between member countries thereby leading to more 
idiosyncratic activity and income correlation because of common demand shocks.  
 
Graphically, it is showed in Figure 3. The OCA is downward sloping because there is a trade-
off between economic openness and income correlation. It constitutes a threshold line such 
that countries who have a low degree of economic openness and their incomes are little 
                                                          
 
4 Willett, Permpoon and Wihlborg (2010) consider that the endogenous trade effects of the creation 
of the EMU are difficult to interpret because it is necessary to develop a better understanding of the 
factors which have caused an increase of trade in general before one can fully link the trade effects 
with the creation of the euro. In this way, the effects of the common currency (reductions in transaction 
cost and exchange rate risk) should be distinguished from the ‘EMU-effects’, which can be caused 
by institutional and macroeconomic changes in most countries who have gain credibility with respect 
to inflation control after substituting their national central banks for the ECB. 
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correlated, the monetary independence will be preferable (right side). Contrary, countries 
who are widely opened will converge and monetary unification will be their best option. 
Frankel and Rose (1998) observed that the effect of increasing trade between member 
countries of a monetary union over business cycles correlations may depend on the type 
trade they are engaged in. If trade is inter-industry, countries will produce goods in which 
they have comparative advantage such that there will be a negative correlation between 
trade and income correlation. In this way, more integration moves countries to the left from 
the OCA line5. However, if trade is mostly within industries, the specialization effect will be 
small and countries will prefer the unification (right-hand side). Frankel and Rose used a 
sample of 21 countries and data from 1959 to 1993 to test the specialization paradigm. They 
concluded that countries that join a monetary union increase their reciprocal trade and that 
there is a positive and strong correlation between international trade and income correlation. 
In this way, EMU entry may encourage trade expansion and this may result in more 
correlated business cycles: again ‘countries are more likely to satisfy the criteria for entry 
into a monetary union ex post than ex ante’. 
 
 
 Figure 3: The specialization paradigm 
 
 Income  
                      correlation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Trade intensity 
  
 Source: based on Frankel and Rose (1998) 
 
 
It seems that the endogeneity of the OCA theory is really optimistic since it supposes that 
although countries don’t satisfy the criteria ex-ante, they will do it once they join the monetary 
union. In the first section we discussed that when a country becomes a member, it is likely 
to experience drastic changes so that if it had just a little wage and price flexibility before the 
unification, it will start a process of structural reforms afterwards. The reason is that higher 
flexibility would reduce the cost of losing the exchange rate as an adjustment tool in order 
that the unification gives countries incentives to raise flexibility. Beetsma and Giuliodori 
(2010) used a model constructed by Calmfors (2001) to explain the effect of monetary 
unification on reform efforts and the free-riding problems which could emerge. The origin of 
such problems is that the benefits of a structural reform done by a country affects all member 
countries, while costs are supported at a national level resulting in little reforms in union.  
                                                          
5 Frankel and Rose (1998) also note that the OCA line could be in a different position depending on 
the preferences and structural features of countries. Under the same degree of economic openness 
and income correlation, countries who are quite diversified, have similar -preferences in terms of a 
low inflation and have a certain degree of price and wage flexibility could face an OCA line more at 
the left-and thus more easy to traverse- compared to those countries that don’t.  
Monetary 
independence 
is preferable 
Monetary 
unification is 
preferable 
OCA line 
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The conclusion is that the effects of monetary unification on structural reforms is ambiguous, 
because reforms diminish both the natural rate of unemployment and the sacrifice ratio, and  
a lower sacrifice ratio is preferable under monetary independence because an exchange 
rate depreciation cannot cause a deflation. In contrast, monetary authorities of a union can 
support a supply-side reform in a member country by applying a stimulus of aggregate 
demand. 
 
However, Willet, Permpoon and Wihlborg (2010) support that the magnitude of the reforms 
is likely to be relatively modest because their costs are highly visible and affect identifiable 
groups of economic agents while their benefits accustom to come later. They also argue that 
the lack of effective actions in the EMU is that political leaders do not really understand the 
need for reforms. Furthermore, the OECD (2007) finds that structural reforms have not been 
equally strong in all member countries, being the small countries those that have undertaken 
more labor market reforms6. Although the creation of EMU has accelerated product market 
deregulation, it has not occurred the same in labor market and unit labor costs, which have 
diverged substantially between EMU countries since 19997. In particular, while Germany has 
experience a gain of competitiveness of 15%, Spain and Ireland have lost the same 
percentage.  
 
‘While there appears to have been some increase in labor mobility within the euro area, 
there are also mounting concerns about immigrations that suggest strong limitations on 
effective cross-country mobility of workers. There is, of course, higher mobility among some 
types of professionals, but this would seem far from sufficient to meet the labor mobility 
criteria for an OCA’.( Willet, Permpoon and Wihlborg, 2010) 
 
 Eichengreen (2002) also concludes that structural reforms in EMU countries remain partial 
and incomplete.  
 
Moreover, there is not an explicit time horizon for the accomplishment of OCA properties 
after the unification (the endogenous effects of the unification), and EMU countries could be 
expected to undertake deeper structural reforms after major recessions in order to raise their 
flexibility. The problem is that to use recessions as a motivational tool is not a productive 
way to start reforms, because they are more difficult to implement in hard times. Even in this 
case, the endogeneity of labor market seems to be at a great distance. In this aspect, the 
accession candidates into the EMU maybe should comply with a certain degree of labor 
market flexibility as a requisite for entry instead of hoping structural reforms will be made 
once they are inside. 
Warin, Wunnava and Janicki (2009) tested the endogeneity of financial market integration 
in EMU using the bilateral FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) flows. They wanted to measure 
whether the creation of a monetary union results in a better allocation of capital across 
member countries. The conclusions were that income correlations between member 
countries result in an increase in FDI flows. However, convergence in terms of interest rate 
has implied lower FDI flows between EMU members since 1999, suggesting that the 
                                                          
6 The OECD attributes the more intense reform process in smaller countries to the fact that their 
population is more homogenous, and that they face greater costs of not having the exchange rate as 
an adjustment mechanism because of the increase of competitive pressures caused by their high 
degree of economic openness. 
7 The divergence of unit labour costs is harmful since, according to Warin, Wunnava and Janicki 
(2009), convergence in factor endowments (capital and labour) would lead to a rise in Foreign 
Direct Investment flows. 
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structural similarity of countries reduces the interest to invest in these countries. Despite that 
fact, belonging to the EMU increases FDI flows between member countries, the distance 
between them becomes less important and the flows tend to be higher between those 
countries with a greater difference in debt levels. This result supports the intuition of De 
Grauwe (2005) about the rise in FDI flows between EMU members.  
 
 
It is evident that a number of authors have contributed to test the endogeneity of OCA theory 
and that there is evidence of endogeneity in some areas. But, have countries actually 
converged in terms of output?. Are EMU countries growing together? In 1997, Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen constructed an OCA index for the European countries by using exchange rate 
equations and extrapolating the independent variables whose aim was to predict which 
countries would be the best candidates to join the EMU in the future.8  The results divided 
the European countries into three different groups: converged countries, converging 
countries and other countries (see Figure 4). 
 
The first group of converged countries are those which were the prime candidates for EMU 
(Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Ireland and Switzerland)9. The second group refers to those 
countries for whom there is a little convergence (the UK, Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
France) and the results support the decision of the UK and Denmark by opting out of the 
EMU. Finally, the last group is formed by those countries for whom there is no convergence 
and for whom the OCA index is declining over time. There countries are the southern EMU 
members (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain). The authors concluded that changes in the 
OCA index depend on bilateral trade intensity and asymmetric output movements. Thus, 
‘there is a symbiotic relationship between economic integration and monetary integration 
such that economic integration has increased countries’ readiness for monetary integration’.  
From the results of the empirical analysis of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), one may 
deduce that economic integration among EMU countries has not evolved homogeneously, 
leading some countries to converge and others to diverge. 
 
 
                                                    Figure 4: The OCA index over time 
 
                                               Source: Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) 
                                                          
8 For more details about methodology and data used see Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) 
9 Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) highlight the absence of France, whose participation in the EMU 
could be related to political reason rather than economical ones, and the presence of Ireland, since 
its OCA index corresponds to the convergence observed under Maastricht Criteria (De Grauwe, 1996) 
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For its part, Crowley, Garcia and Quah (2013) explored the different economic growth 
dynamics within EMU since the introduction of the euro using wavelet analysis10 and taking 
its results to apply cluster analysis. The conclusions of authors were that correlations in 
growth are higher at low frequencies and correlations at higher frequencies have been 
increasing over time, although certain member states, especially Greece, have experienced 
divergence in dynamics of economic growth. Furthermore, the cluster analysis shows how 
EMU countries falls into different groupings, and Greece is not a clear member of any of 
them.  
 
                                           Figure 5: Unweight fuzzy clustering analysis 
 
 Source: Crowley, Garcia and Quah (2013) 
 
 
In this way, within EMU coexist different growth dynamics and member countries do not form 
a homogeneous bloc which is growing jointly, but there is a core group and approximately 
three groupings of member states. Therefore, it seems that the results of this analysis are 
not a support for the endogeneity of OCA. Although it is expected the business cycles 
synchronization between countries which are subject of a uniform monetary policy, which 
form a Single Market, such that production factors flow between them (countries are more 
likely to satisfy OCA properties ex-post rather than ex-ante), there is evidence of a great 
divergence between EMU members: the endogeneity of economic activity is not a fact.  
 
It is at this point that one may stop and think whether the EMU was an optimal currency 
union when it was formed, or whether the endogeneity of OCA properties has made EMU 
optimal. The widespread answer is no. Certainly, labor market flexibility in many EMU 
countries is still so low, in spite of some reforms started but incomplete. Furthermore, it is 
important to emphasize the lack in EMU of an adjustment mechanisms at union level to 
stabilize economic activity when symmetric shocks occur. Fiscal policy is set at a national 
level because there is absence of a fiscal authority at a union level, which may lead to a lack 
of coordination as monetary policy is set uniformly by the ECB. This single monetary policy 
is applied over a conglomerate of heterogeneous countries, which have different degrees of 
development and this could lead to current account imbalances between member states. 
We have already seen that there is endogeneity in some areas. However, EMU countries 
are not growing together, but there is divergence in economic activity. Either by coincidence 
or not, countries which in reality form an optimum monetary union (the Core), are those 
                                                          
10 The wavelet analysis is divided into two types: discrete wavelet analysis and continuous wavelet 
analysis. The first one extracts cycles at different frequencies from the data while the second one 
evaluates how the relationships uncovered in the discrete analysis change over time. For a 
thorough comprehension see Crowley, Garcia and Quah (2013). 
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which started the EMU and were the first to comply with the optimality criteria ex ante11 
(Handler, 2013). This subset of countries, according to De Grauwe (2009) the Benelux 
countries, Germany, France and Austria, are more likely to obtain net gains from the 
unification than periphery countries.  This could lead us to believe that it is important for 
future countries to comply with OCA properties before joining the EMU. 
 
 
 
 
4. Empirical methodology and Data 
 
The conclusion that one can draw from the previous sections is that although empirical 
evidence supports the endogeneity of OCA in some areas, there is an obvious divergence 
with respect to economic growth dynamics inside EMU. Due to its importance, we are going 
to focus on the area named by De Grauwe-Mongelli (2005) as ‘the endogeneity of labor 
market’. 
 
Our objective here is to find evidence supporting the following hypothesis: ‘The creation of 
the EMU may be a stimulus for countries to rise flexibility in their labor markets, since it is a 
way to ease the adjustment process after a shock, under the lack of the exchange rate as 
an adjustment tool’.  The approach we are going to use in based on Frankel and Rose 
(1998). They estimated the relationship between bilateral income correlations and bilateral 
trade intensity, and found that there is a strong positive effect of trade intensity on income 
correlations (Frankel and Rose, 1998), thereby supporting the idea of endogenity of OCA12. 
Instead of that, we are going to search for evidence supporting that countries who rise 
flexibility in their labor market tend to have a higher income correlation, and whether or not 
the creation of the EMU has stimulated such structural reforms. In order to do that, the 
indicator we will consider as a proxy of the lack of structural reforms on the labor market is 
a high unemployment rate. Our analysis arises from the assumption that the higher the 
flexibility in labor market, the lower the unemployment rate. Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) 
used a model borrowed from Calmfors (2001) to explain the free-rider problems of structural 
reforms in a monetary union.13 That model proofs our assumption, since it assumes that a 
structural labor market reform, si>0, reduces equilibrium unemployment: ui*= u – δsi, δ>0, 
being ‘u’ the unemployment equilibrium rate in the absence of reforms. They concluded 
saying that ‘free-riding problems may become less severe if the structural reforms not only 
diminish the equilibrium unemployment rate, but also the sensitivity of unemployment to 
shocks’ (Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2010).   
 
However, Beetsma and Giuliodiori (2010) were not convinced of the positive effect of 
structural reforms in labor market on the unemployment equilibrium rate. Therefore, trying 
to find some supports to our assumption, we constructed graphs of the evolution of the 
                                                          
11 Italy and Belgium are exceptions since their public debt was higher than the annual GDP when the 
EMU started. 
12 Increased integration results in more highly correlated business cycles due to common demand 
shocks or intra-industry trade. In this way, countries that may appear to be poor candidates for EMU 
entry, are more likely to satisfy the criteria ex post than ex ante (Frankel and Rose, 1998). 
13 Such free-riding problems are analogous to those in fiscal policy. In a monetary union, the benefits 
of an individual reform spreads to all member countries due to the common monetary policy, while 
the costs are supported at the national level. This results in little reforms in the union. 
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unemployment rate in the period time 1980-2011, and the level and evolution of four 
indicators of labor market flexibility in several countries of our sample. There are a multitude 
of indicators used to estimate the degree of such flexibility. Here, we have just considered 
two ‘Government policy’ variables (RI, and GOVIN), and two variables describing the 
institutional setting of the labor market (WCOOR and UD). Such four variables are the same 
as those used by Camarero, D’Adamo and Tamarit (2013) in their construction of the wage 
equation in the Euro Area14.  As far as government policy variables are concerned, RI 
(routine involvement of employers and unions in wage bargaining) represents the 
‘concentration system’ and goes from 0 (no concentration) to 2 (full concentration). GOVIN 
is and indicator of government intervention in wage bargaining, and goes from 0 (no 
intervention) to 5 (government imposes wage settlements). In relation to the ‘institutional 
variables’, WCOOR goes from 1 (full decentralization) to 5 (full coordination), and UD (union 
density) represents the percentage of employees who are members of a union.15 
 
The graphs in the Appendix show the evolution of these four variables jointly with the 
unemployment rate from 1980 to 2011 in some industrialized countries16. The variables RI, 
GOVIN and WCOOR are measured in the right vertical axis, while union density and 
unemployment rate are measured in the left vertical one. We can see a general tendency 
towards a lower union density in almost all countries considered. However, it is difficult to 
find a link between the unemployment rate and the variables, since the countries with the 
lowest unemployment rate are Nordic (Norway and Sweden) and Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Australia, USA, UK and Canada). While the first group have a lot of rigidities in their labor 
markets, the second one is much more flexible (see Appendix I). Furthermore, Austria, 
Japan and Switzerland have remarkably low unemployment rates, and some rigidities in 
their labor markets. Contrary, the country with the highest unemployment rate along the 
period considered is Spain, characterized by an unstable labor market (the involvement of 
government or unions in wage bargaining vary from year to year), some rigidities and no 
tendency toward more flexibility. Honestly, four variables are not enough to proof if labor 
market reforms would have a positive effect on the unemployment rate, due to the 
involvement of a number of factors and its dependence on the economic cycle. Nonetheless, 
labor market reforms aim to reduce the structural unemployment rate. In any event, an 
amount of the countries with a low unemployment rate are characterized by flexible labor 
markets, thus labor market reforms could lead to a lower structural unemployment rate. The 
recent experience of the German labor market reforms (Hartz), which have been estimated 
to reduce the German structural unemployment rate by 1.4 percentage point (Krebs and 
Scheffel, 2013), are a proof of this.  
 
Along the same lines followed by Frankel and Rose (1998), but with and objective much 
more modest, we will try to find graphical evidence supporting that structural reforms in labor 
markets (that will lead to a lower unemployment rate) lead countries to converge in real 
terms. In order to that, we use data from 22 industrialized countries17 and the sample period 
                                                          
14 They use four government policy variables (dEA, TWED, GOVIN and RI), and four variables 
describing the institutional setting of the labour market (WCOOR, EPL, UD and MWS) instead. For 
further details, see Camarero, d’Adamo and Tamarit (2013). 
15 The data are taken from the ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, 
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts. (Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labor 
Studies, AIAS) 
16 The countries are Australia, Japan, Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, 
Sweden, Norway, UK, USA and Canada. 
17 The sample countries are those used by Frankel and Rose (1998), but we add Luxembourg : 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
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is 1980-201318. First, we take series of real GDP and the unemployment rate from 1980 to 
2013 of the 22 countries and take natural logarithms of the first variable. Second, we de-
trend de logarithm of GDP in order to focus on business cycle fluctuations. To do that, we 
use the simplest method, taking differences of the (log of the) variable (log (GDP)t – 
log(GDP)t-1). We have therefore one year less in our sample period, from 1981 to 201319. 
The series of unemployment rate are not transformed. 
 
When we have done this, we are able to obtain bilateral correlations (between each country-
pair i and j) of (log of) real GDP over a given span of time. In this case, we compute them 
for the whole sample and for three differentiated periods after splitting the sample. 
Consequently, we obtain bilateral correlations for the sample period 1981-2013, and for 
three differentiated periods: 1981-1992, 1992-2000 and 2000-2013. In the same way, we 
also compute correlations between each country pair using the unemployment rate variable 
for the same periods. Since we have 22 countries, we obtain 231 pairs. Therefore, we are 
left with 231 bilateral country-pair correlations for real activity and 231 for unemployment 
rate (over different periods of time), that is to say two data for each country-pair. Finally, we 
represent the bilateral correlations of (log of) GDP facing bilateral correlations of the 
unemployment rate for each pair in a scatter-plot, thus obtaining 4 plots: one for the whole 
sample period, and one for each of the 3 sub-periods (1981-1992, 1992-2000 and 2000-
2013). In the following section, the results are showed and explained.  
 
 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9 show the resulting graphs after confronting bilateral correlations of real 
GDP with bilateral correlations of the unemployment rate for each country-pair for the whole 
sample period, the 1981-1992 period, the 1992-2000 period and the 2000-2013 period, 
respectively.  
 
Figure 6 shows that there is a direct link between unemployment correlations and GDP 
correlations. What this means is that the higher the unemployment correlation, the higher 
the GDP correlation. Therefore, countries that implement structural reforms in their labour 
markets so that, according to our assumption, will have lower structural unemployment 
rates, will tend to have a higher income correlation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). 
18 Series of unemployment rate and real GDP for the 22 countries along the sample period 1980-2013 
are taken from the International Monetary Fund Database. 
19 This is because we obtain de-trend variable in period t subtracting his value in t-1. The first period 
after the de-trend procedure will be 1981, since we would need the (log of the) GDP in 1979 to obtain 
the GDP value de-trend in 1980. 
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But is after splitting our sample in three different periods that one can observe that as well 
as the relation between GDP correlations and unemployment correlations is positive in all 3 
periods, it is growing from period to period. At the top of the figures 7, 8 and 9, it is written 
the regression line which would adjust to the data in each period. We can observe that the 
slope parameter is 0.407 in period 1981-1992, 0.487 in period 1992-2000 and 0.708 in 
period 2000-2013, and the dispersion of data is lower in the last period. It may prove the 
endongeneity of labour market: the creation of EMU has stimulated countries to increase 
flexibility in their labour markets, leading countries to a higher convergence in their 
unemployment rates and thus, in their real incomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Scatter-plot (GDP correlations vs Unemployment 
correlations (Sample period: 1981-2013) 
Figure 7: Scatter-plot (GDP correlations vs Unemployment correlations. 
Sub-period: 1981-1992 
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Figure 8: Scatter-plot (GDP correlations vs Unemployment correlations. 
Sub-period: 1992-2000 
Figure 9: Scatter-plot (GDP correlations vs Unemployment correlations). 
Sub-period: 2000-2013 
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It is important to focus on the Eurozone countries, since the empirical analysis has not been 
done using only EMU countries, but using 22 industrialized states, inside and outside EMU. 
We are especially interested in studying whether or not the peripheral Eurozone countries 
have initiated structural reforms in their labor markets, then fostering a catching-up process 
with the unemployment rates of the Core countries and  leading to higher real convergence. 
To do that, we will consider Germany as reference Core country, one of the EMU countries 
with the most flexible labor market. In the period 2003-2005 the German government 
implemented a number of labor market reforms, the so-called Hartz reforms, in view of 
dismal labor market performance and the tightening of the social security budget (Krebs and 
Scheffel, 2013). The aim of the Hartz reforms was to improve the matching efficiency of the 
employment agencies, to provide incentives for unemployed to search for jobs and to 
increase labor demand decreasing tax wedges and deregulating the labor market. The 
reforms consisted of, for example, the elimination of the social security tax for jobs paying 
up to 400 euros per month, and the reduction of the social security contributions for jobs 
paying up to 800 euros per month, as well as they deregulated the labor market . On the 
other hand, the German government adopted a more market-based approach and reduced 
the benefits payments for most households previously receiving Unemployment Assistance 
or Social Assistance20. Krebs and Scheffel (2013) developed a model in order to evaluate 
the macroeconomic effect of the Hartz reforms, especially Hartz IV, and concluded that they 
reduced the German long-run unemployment rate by 1.4 percentage points. This can be 
observed in the following graphs. Figure 10 shows that between 1992 and 2007, peripheral 
countries as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland (particularly the last one) maintained 
higher real GDP growth rates than Germany because of the convergence process21. When 
the current economic and financial crisis started in 2007, all EMU countries experienced a 
fall in their GDP growth rates. Germany’s GDP fell in more than 5% in 2009, while Spain’s 
GDP fell in around 3 percentage points. However, the unemployment rate in Germany barely 
raised but followed a downward tendency, while in the Spain (which have maintained 
historically high unemployment rates), started to grow inordinately until 26% in 2013.  
The other peripheral countries also suffered a great growth in their unemployment rates, 
leading them in 2013 with an unemployment rate a percentage far greater than the German 
rate (see Figure 11). In brief, the flexibility of German labor market, allows Germany the 
maintenance of workstations in hard times giving enterprises freedom to reduce temporarily 
working days in order to adjust production to the necessities. In other words, the weaknesses 
of peripheral countries’ labor markets come to light when the economic conditions are not 
the best. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 The reforms were applied progressively through Hartz I and Hartz II (Jan 1st 2003), Hartz III (Jan 
1st 2004) and Hartz IV (Jan 1st 2005). 
21 According to the traditional economic literature, this phenomenon in called β convergence: 
countries who start with a lower level of GDP per capita, will grow faster than those richer.  
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Returning to the issue at hand, we are going to study the evolution of correlations obtained, 
in terms of unemployment rate and real GDP, between Germany and the peripheral 
countries: Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland. 
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Figure 10: Real GDP growth rate (1992-2014): Germany vs Peripheral 
countries 
Figure 11: Unemployment rate (1992-2013): Germany vs Peripheral countries 
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 Figure 12: Unemployment and GDP correlations: Germany vs Spain 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Unemployment and GDP correlations: Germany vs Greece 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Unemployment and GDP correlations: Germany vs Portugal 
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Figure 15: Unemployment and GDP correlations: Germany vs Ireland 
 
 
 
 
In this case, from figures 12, 13, 14 and 15 the results are not as optimistic as before. The 
four peripheral countries (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Ireland) have maintained a 
downward tendency in their unemployment rate correlations with respect to Germany, 
moving from positive correlations in the first sub-period to negative correlations in the last 
one. Their unemployment correlations regarding Germany in 1981-1992 were around 0.5, 
and they have become strongly negative in 2000-2013, close to -1. What it means is that 
their unemployment rates has been growing, while the German unemployment rate has 
been decreasing (it can be observed in Figure 11).  It’s important to mention here that after 
the creation of the EMU, all member countries agreed to implement labor market reforms, 
being Germany the only country that actually did it. This fact could explain the divergence of 
the unemployment rates. For its part, GDP correlations with Germany, that have been 
positive in four countries in all sub-periods, has remained almost invariable in the cases of 
Portugal and Ireland (around 0.5), while grew in Portugal and Spain between 1981 and 1992, 
and fell in the last sub-period. The GDP correlation Spain-Germany in 2000-2013 returned 
to the level of the initial period (0.5), while the correlation Greece-Germany became near 
zero (see figures 12 and 13). 
 
 On the other hand, it is very hard to find here a positive linkage between unemployment 
correlations and GDP correlations, despite it can be observed easily in figures 6 to 9. In the 
case of Spain, and Greece, between de second and the third sub-period, the fall in 
unemployment correlation was accompanied by a fall in GDP correlation, while between the 
first and the second period, GDP correlation raised and unemployment correlation fell. 
However, in Portugal and Ireland the continuous fall in the unemployment correlation, 
becoming negative, was not followed by a fall in GDP correlation, but it remained almost 
unchangeable, with a slight growth (see figures 14 and 15). 
 
Therefore, when we focus on the Eurozone, in particular the peripheral countries and its 
convergence with the Core countries as Germany, we don’t find empirical evidence 
supporting the endogeneity of labor markets of the endogenous OCA theory. For that cluster 
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of countries, an increase (or decrease) in the unemployment correlation is not accompanied 
by a higher (lower) GDP correlation.  Hence, that idea that when countries initiate structural 
reforms in their labor markets tend to converge in real terms is not fulfilled here. Moreover, 
the unemployment rate correlation of peripheral countries with respect to Germany has 
become strongly negative from period to period. It may prove that the creation of the EMU 
has not stimulated structural reforms in the peripheral Eurozone countries, which in addition 
are those with major adjustment problems facing asymmetric shocks. The lack of such 
reforms or their incompleteness has caused that the unemployment correlations with the 
German unemployment rate has followed a downward tendency since the first sub-period, 
achieving a value near -1 in period 2000-2013, in the current economic and financial crisis: 
while Germany has reached to maintain workstations, the unemployment rate of peripheral 
countries has exploded (especially in Spain and Greece). Is in this point when one could 
think of the necessity to require countries with rigid labor markets to increase its flexibility 
before joining the EMU, since a monetary union not always means a stimulus for member 
countries to perform structural reforms, and problems multiply in hard times. 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The endogenous Optimum Currency Area theory states that the suitability for countries to 
be part of a currency union may not depend on the basis of their past behavior or on their 
efforts during the convergence period, since once a country becomes a member, drastic 
changes are expected to occur. In this way, countries are more able to comply with OCA 
criteria ex-post than ex-ante. The empirical literature has found evidence of endogeneity in 
some areas, for example monetary unification increases bilateral trade between member 
countries leading them to increase their bilateral income correlation. However, there is 
evidence of different growth dynamics coexisting inside EMU and a great divergence 
between member countries since its creation. 
 
In this paper we have focused on the area of the endogenous OCA theory called by De 
Grauwe-Mongelli (2005) as ‘the endogenity of the labor market’, which implies that monetary 
unification could stimulate member countries to increase flexibility in their labor markets, in 
order to ease the adjustment process after a shock under the lack of the exchange rate as 
an adjustment tool, leading them to converge in real terms. We have tested the hypothesis 
of endogeneity of labor markets under the assumption that structural labor market reforms 
mean a lower unemployment rate. Using a sample of 22 industrialized countries, we find 
that there is a positive relationship between bilateral unemployment rate correlations and 
bilateral GDP correlations which is, in addition, growing over time. That is, labor market 
reforms imply higher income correlations between countries and the relationship between 
the variables is stronger and stronger.   
 
However, when we study the relationship between unemployment correlations and GDP 
correlations of peripheral countries with respect to Germany (one of the EMU countries with 
more flexibility in the labor market after the Hartz reforms), we do not observe the same. 
Bilateral correlation of unemployment rates between peripheral countries and Germany 
have decreased along the sample period going from 0.5 to -1, due to the great growth of 
unemployment rate of the first ones (especially since the current economic and financial 
crisis) and the stability of the German unemployment rate, which has even decreased. 
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Furthermore, in some peripheral countries, this tendency has been accompanied by a 
decrease in the GDP bilateral correlations (Greece), while in others, this correlations have 
been positive and increasing over time. 
 
Therefore, in the case of peripheral EMU countries, the endogeneity of the labor market is 
not fulfilled. The creation of the EMU has not stimulated countries to increase flexibility in 
their labor markets or the reforms have been really timid and incomplete, such that the 
distance of their unemployment rates with respect to the Core countries (as Germany) has 
increased over time and becomes higher in hard times, precisely when the reforms are more 
difficult to implement. In this way, it seems that the creation of a monetary union does not 
stimulate necessarily structural labor market reforms in member countries; that is, future 
candidates could be required to increase labor market flexibility as a prerequisite for 
becoming members because the endogeneity of the labor market is still far from being a 
fact. Furthermore, such structural labour market reforms would allow countries to converge 
in real terms and to create a sustainable and integrating growth. 
 
This research faces a number of limitations, since the conclusions are based basically on 
the empirical evidence. For future investigations, it could be interesting to use further 
econometric techniques and deepen on the effects and duration, for example, of an output 
shock on the GDP and unemployment in countries with rigid and flexible labor markets, in 
order to measure the importance of structural labor market reforms. 
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Appendix - The degree of flexibility in labour markets and 
the unemployment rate 
 
Graph 1: Australia 
 
 
Graph 2: UK 
 
Graph 3: USA 
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Graph 4: Canada 
 
 
Graph 5: Sweden 
 
 
Graph 6: Austria 
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Graph 7: Norway 
 
Graph 8: Switzerland 
 
 
Graph 9: Japan 
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Graph 10: Belgium
 
 
Graph 11: Germany 
 
 
Graph 12: France 
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Graph 13: Italy 
 
 
Graph 14: Spain 
 
